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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Enterprises  need  finance  for  investment  and  acquire  it  either  by  internally 
generated  finance  or  externally  generated  finance,  which  are  closely  related  to  the 
ownership structure, financial market development and enforcement of law of a country. 
In underdeveloped companies with foreign owners have an advantage in their access to 
external finance as compare to domestically owned companies because their financial 
resources coming from abroad.  
Access to external finance is a key determinant of a firm’s ability to develop, 
operate, and expand. Economic researchers have studied how various macroeconomic 
and microeconomic factors influence such access; for example, it has been shown that the 
need of external finance to depend on the macroeconomic environment, since economic 
downturns tend to limit firms’ ability to borrow and banks’ willingness to lend. This 
“credit  channel”  research  argues  that  corporate  access  to  credit  is  the  principal 
mechanism linking monetary policy and the real economy. At the micro level, research 
has  shown  that  characteristics  specific  to  a  firm  influence  the  degree  to  which 
macroeconomic changes affect its access to external financing; specifically, firms that are 
more  vulnerable  financially—such  as  smaller,  younger,  riskier,  and  more  indebted 
firms—are found to be more affected by tighter monetary policy. 
This  is  conformed  by  empirical  evidence  that  firms  with  high  dependence  on 
external  finance  grow  faster  in  countries  where  external  finance  is  readily  available.  
Corporations with limited access to external resources may still operate in the informal 
sector and at a reduced scale in under developed countries [Rajan and Zingler (1998); 
Livine  and  Zervos  (1998)].  The  question  remained  unanswered  what  determines  the 
cross-firm differences in investor access to finance for investment especially in emerging 
markets like Pakistan. 
“When laws are protective of outside investors and well enforced, investors are 
willing to finance firms, and financial markets are both broader and more valuable. In 
contrast, where laws are un-protective of investors, the development of financial markets 
is stunted. When their rights are better protected by the law, outside investors are willing  
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to  pay  more  for  financial  assets  such  as  equity  and  debt.  In  turn,  this  enables 
entrepreneurs  to  finance  their  investments  externally,  leading  to  the  expansion  of 
financial markets” [La Porta, et al. (1999)]. 
Many studies show that to promote economic growth attention has shifted to the 
capital  markets  due  to  the  limited  conventional  sources of  raising  finance.  In  capital 
markets,  corporate governance plays important role in determining  external financing 
sources provided by outside investors. Corporate governance institutions appear to be 
weaker in developing than in developed countries and thus provide less of a check on 
managers  in  developing  countries  who  wish  to  issue  equity  to  finance  low  return 
investments. Managers who wish to undertake low return investments in countries with 
strong corporate governance systems accordingly prefer to rely on internal cash flows to 
finance these investments, managers making similar investments in countries with weak 
corporate governance systems are freer to use the equity market as a source of finance. 
Thus,  differences  in  corporate  governance  structures  will  be  seen  to  explain  both 
differences in the sources of finance for investment across countries and differences in 
the returns on investment [Gompers, et al. (2003)]. Corporate governance has recently 
received much attention for this purpose we also investigate the impact of ownership 
concentration, and investment opportunities on corporate governance practices and show 
how important is the firm level corporate governance practices for corporate valuation 
and access to external finance.  
Our empirical analyses identify not only the determinants of external finance 
resources,  but  also  shows  how  law  influence  external  financing,  corporate 
governance practice and corporate valuation. To investigate all we use firm level data 
of 50 corporations listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE).   We use Tobin’s Q to 
measure corporate valuation. To establish the empirical framework on the basis of 
theory that better legal environment of a country is associated with higher valuation 
of corporate assets, good corporate governance practice, and financial development, 
we use the rule of law as indicator of enforcement of law in Pakistan. To understand 
the  effects  of  ownership,  we  focus  only  on  the  concentration  of  ownership  in  the 
hand of top three shareholders because our this restriction is in line with the previous  
literature  that  reveal  the  fact  that  in  countries  with  poor  legal  environment,  it  is 
efficient  for  the  corporations  to  retain  control  of  their  firms  in  hand  of  few 
investors.
12 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 of the paper presents 
review of the literature. Section 3 describes the data and Methodology. Section 4 presents 
empirical finding.  Section 5 concludes.   
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Evidence  from  the  previous  literature  shows  that  financial  market 
underdevelopment  and  limited  availability  of  bank  credit  is  serious  barrier  for  the 
establishment of new enterprises and constraint to economics growth.
23 Recent literature 
on law and finance shows that investor protection plays an important role in shaping the  
1See Jensen-Meckling (1976), Zingales (1995) and Bebchuk (1999). 
2Rajan and Zingales (1998), Levine, Ross (1999), Cetorelli and Philip (2006), De Soto (2000), Beck,  
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financial structure of an economy, by affecting the relative importance of equity and debt 
financing. 
González, Lopez, and Saurina (2007) examine access by Spanish firms to external 
financing from bank and non-bank sources over the period from 1992 to 2002 and their 
results provide insights into the determinants of firms’ borrowing efforts in Spain and 
more broadly. For example, they find that Spanish firms are quite dependent on short-
term,  non-bank  financing,  which  is  less  sensitive  to  firm  characteristics  than  bank 
financing. Yet, short-term bank financing is accessed more frequently during economic 
expansions, suggesting that firms substitute away from more expensive forms of non-
bank financing as their conditions improve. The authors confirm that smaller, younger, 
riskier, and more indebted firms rely more on external credit than on internal financing, 
such as retained earnings and other equity, and they expand these results by showing that 
the nature of firms’ banking relationships, such as the number of banks borrowed from 
and whether collateral is required for the loans, also influences access to external finance. 
In Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2005) study the relation between firm-level disclosure 
quality and the availability of external finance to Finnish firms. They estimate excess 
growth is made possible by external finance and the excess growth is associated with the 
quality of disclosure which seems to be strongest for financially constrained firms. Their 
empirical analysis identify the firms in need for external finance voluntarily look for 
good disclosure quality, because it reduces barriers to external finance.  
Durnev  and  Kim  (2003)  in  their  paper  using  firm-level  governance  and 
transparency  data  on  859  firms  in  27  countries,  find  that  firms  with  greater  growth 
opportunities,  greater  needs  for  external  financing,  and  more  concentrated  cash  flow 
rights practice higher-quality governance and disclose more. Moreover, firms that score 
higher in governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in the stock market. 
Equally  important,  all  these  relations  are  stronger  in  countries  that  are  less  investor 
friendly,  demonstrating  that  firms  do  adapt  to  poor  legal  environments  to  establish 
efficient governance practices. 
The findings of La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998) show that weak investor protection 
limits  excess  to  external  finance.  While  De  Soto  (2000)  suggests  that  poor  legal 
enforcement of corporate laws and unclear property rights limit individuals’ ability to 
commit contracts and thus their excess to external resources. Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002) argue that better transparency and disclosure of information to the shareholders, 
and the enforcement of laws that protect their rights, reduce the costs of external finance. 
Perotti and Volpin (2007) provide evidence that better investor protection not only favor 
competition  and  entry  into  the  financial  developed  sector,  it  is  also  better  for  the 
politically accountable countries. The study also suggests that improving formal investor 
protection laws while ignoring its enforcement may not improve access to finance. 
In view of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) financial liberalisations are 
most successful in countries with good political institutions. Bebchuk and Neeman 
(2006) provide evidence that block-holders by using corporate resources protect their 
control  benefits  and  may  undermine  good  corporate  governance.  La  Porta,  et  al. 
(1997, 1998a) in their study conclude that differences in the structure of laws and 
quality of their enforcement, such as legal origin of their laws, play important role 
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results of Beck and Levins (2005) also show that legal origin
34  has very significant 
impact on firm’s abilities to raise to external finance. Their data indicate that firms in 
French Legal Countries face higher obstacles in contracting for external finance than 
firms in other countries. Firms in countries with common law face lower financial 
obstacle  than  firms  in  civil  law  countries.  Moreover  their  result  also  indicate  that 
foreign-owned firms and large firms face lower financing obstacles than domestic, or 
small  firm,  whereas  family  owned  firms  particularly  face  high  obstacle  in  raising 
external  finance.  Countries  with  high  GDP  face  lower  obstacle  in  raising  external 
finance than countries with lower GDP. 
This paper is one of the first attempts to study that firms with greater growth 
opportunities, greater needs for external financing practice higher-quality governance and 
disclose  more.  Moreover,  firms  that  score  higher  in  governance  and  transparency 
rankings are valued higher in the stock market.   
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1.  Data 
To  asses  determinant  of  external  recourses,  corporate  governance  and  firm 
valuation at firm level, we use data of 50 firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange.
45 The 
data set is obtained from the annual reports of these firms for the year 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006  and  2007.
56  Data on  rule of  law  has been  taken  from World  Bank governance 
indicators. The ranking of rule of law as ranging from 0 to 1 for Pakistan is 0.34 as 
average of five years. That indicates very poor legal environment for Pakistan in term of 
enforcement of law.
67 
We do not have any direct measure of external finance. Followed by La Porta, et 
al. (1998) we used ratio of the stock market capitalisation held by minorities to sales in 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 for all 50 non-financial firms. Firm X stock market 
capitalisation  held  by  minorities  is  computed  as  the  product  of  the  stock  market 
capitalisation of firm X and the average percentage of common shares not owned by the 
top three shareholders of firm X.  
The corporate governance index and disclosure and transparency index are used 
which are developed by the authors kin their study [Javid and Robina (2006)]. In order to 
construct corporate governance index for the firms listed on KSE, a broad, multifactor 
corporate governance rating is done which is based on the data obtained from the annual 
reports of the firms submitted to SECP. The index construction is as follows: for every 
firm,  there  are  22  governance  proxies  or  indicators  are  selected,  these  indicators  are 
categorised into three main themes. The three categories or sub-indices consist of: eight 
factors for the Board, seven for ownership, shareholdings and seven for transparency, 
disclosure and audit.  
3La Porta, et al. (1998) identify mainly two legal families around the world, common law origin and 
civil law origin. 
4List of companies is provided in Appendix Table A1. 
5The list of variable and set of instruments is given in Appendix Table A2. 
6Although as Pakistan belongs to common law countries legal origin. In view of La Porta, et al. (1997) 
common law countries provide strong investor protection in term of law on books. The ranking of rule of law 
indicate the fact that enforcement of law is very low against high ranking on law on books.  External Financial Resource Management   453
The weighting is in the construction of index is based on subjective judgments. 
The  assigned  priorities  amongst  and  within  each  category  is  guided  by  empirical 
literature and financial experts in this area. The maximum score is 100, then, a score of 
100 is assigned if factor is observed, 80 if largely observed, 50 for partially observed and 
0 if it is not observed. The average is taken out and we arrive at the rating of one sub-
index.
78 By taking the average of three sub-indices we obtain CGI for a particular firm.  
3.2.  Methodological Framework 
The  purpose  is  to  assess  the  ability  of  firms  to  raise  external  finance  through 
equity,  when  they  have  different  characteristics  (size,  investment  opportunities, 
ownership concentration), having adopted different level of corporate governance and 
doing  business  in  poor  legal  environment.
89  We  examine  whether  variation  in  firm-
specific need of external finance is associated with level of corporate governance and 
legal environment is associated with differences in firm value across the firms. For a 
given level of profitable investment opportunities, firms with greater need of external 
financing practice high quality governance [Durnev and Kim (2003); Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)].  The  contrary  evidence  comes  from  the  study  by  Demirgue-Kunt  and 
Maksimovie (1998) which argues that profitable firms have more internally generated 
funds and hence rely less on internal financing.  To analyse that firm with more need of 
external financing practice better governance, we used scores of Corporate Governance 
Index and scores of disclosure and transparency as independent variable. It is expected 
that there is positive relation between external financing needs and quality of corporate 
governance. Further, in countries with weak legal regimes firms have difficulty in raising 
external finance due to investors’ lack of trust in legal protection of their rights [La Porta, 
et al. (1998)]. In this study we analyse the significance of rule of law as determinant of 
external financing. Since we are assessing influence of legal environment across the firm, 
therefore we introduced this variable in interaction terms.  
To  deal  with  problem  that  firm  specific  factors  can  jointly  affect  the  need  of 
external finance, corporate governance quality of the firm and firm performance and thus 
induce  spurious  correlation  between  them.  Therefore  we  introduce  set  of  control 
variables: investment opportunities by the firm, firm size, leverage and concentration of 
ownership. Therefore first we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms which are in need of greater external finance practice higher level of 
corporate governance.  
To test this hypothesis we form the following model following La Porta, et al. 
(1997) and Pistor, et al. (2000): 
it i i i i i CGI Lw Size Inv CGI EF * 4 3 2 1  …  …  (1) 
Where EFt is external finance that is calculated by multiplying market capitalisation of 
each firm with percentage of shares that are not taken by the top five shareholders of each 
firm, CGIi  is a vector of corporate governance index measured by Javid and Robina  
7Sub-Index  include  (i)  Board  composition  index, (ii) The  ownership  and  shareholdings  Index, (iii) 
Disclosure and Transparency. 
8As indicated by the ranking of rule of law by World Bank. Javid and Iqbal   454
(2006), Invi is investment opportunities measured by the past growth in sales, Lwi is rule 
of law that is used for the proxy of enforcement of law, and Sizei is measured by the log 
of total asset.  i   is random error term. 
H2: Firms with good corporate governance are valued higher.  
it i i i i i i i CGI Lw Size Inv Own Exf CGI Q * 6 5 4 3 2 1  …  (2) 
Where Qi is Tobin’s Q measured by market value of common equity plus book value of 
long term debt divided by book value of total assets and other variables are same as 
defined  for  model  (1).  It  is  expected  that  firms  with  better  investment  opportunities, 
better corporate governance practices should have higher valuation. 
H3:  The  quality  of  corporate  governance  is  positively  related  to  growth  in 
investment opportunities, and negatively to concentration of ownership.  
Our empirical model takes the following form following Dunev and Kim (2003) 
and others: 
it i i
i i i i i i i i
Exf Lw




6 5 4 3 2 1                    
The  variables  used  in  model  (3)  are  same  as  we  defined  for  model  (1).  In 
estimating model (1), (2) and (3) an important issue is endogenity [Black, et al. (2003) 
and Durnev and Kim (2003)]. A growing firm with large need of external financing has 
more incentive to adopt better governance practices in an attempt to lower cost of capital 
[Klapper and Love (2002) and Gompers, et al. (2003)].  These growth opportunities are 
reflected in the valuation of the firm, implying a positive association between governance 
and firm performance. The firms with more need of external finance would be more 
likely to choose better governance structure because firm’s insiders believe that better 
governance structure will further raise firm value they adopt good governance to signal 
that insider behave well and they can easily excess to external finances. This endogenity 
problem  in  estimation  is  resolved  by  applying  Generalised  Method  of  Moments  as 
estimation technique.  
In model (1), we regress external finance on CGI scores and control variables 
(investment opportunities and size) and interaction of rule of law with CGI scores 3and 
with growth of investment opportunities. [Durnev and Kim (2003)]. We have estimated 
in model (2) that how the firm’s performance estimated by Tobin Q is influenced by need 
of external finance, corporate governance indices and other control variables [Kaplan and 
Zingales’ (1997); Black, et al. (2002) and Klein, et al. (2005)]. The model (3) develops 
the  linkage  between  corporate  governance  and  ownership  concentration,  quality  of 
enforcement of law and other firm specific variables and interaction terms [Durnev and 
Kim (2003)]. In the set of control variables which include size (natural logarithm of 
assets) and investment opportunities (average sale growth) are used in estimation. Firm 
size and growth control for potential advantages of scale and scope, market power and 
market opportunities. The leverage (long term debt/total assets) controls for different risk 
characteristics  of  firm.  Ownership  concentration  is  expected  to  improve  investor 
protection. In some firms the entrepreneur founders who used their own resources and External Financial Resource Management   455
retained earning to finance their firms and have significant ownership stakes in the listed 
firms,  we  address  this  issue  by  using  ownership  concentration  by  top  five  largest 
shareholders.  
Our models are estimated on the data of 50 firms for the year 2002 to 2007 using 
panel  data  estimation  technique.  This  estimation  technique  is  adopted  to  cope  with 
presence of endogeniety in governance variables [Black, et al. 2002) and Durnev and 
Kim (2003)].  A firm with foreign investment is assumed to be adopting good governance 
practice and has likely to have more access to external finance. In the same way the block 
holding  firm
910is  associated  with  more  monitoring  and  more  familiar  with  good 
governance practices and have easier to get external finance. The longer the period of 
listing, the more chances of investors to familiar with investment strategy of firm and less 
likely chances of information asymmetry and this limit the ability of firm to impose poor 
practice  and  more  likely  chances  of  getting  cheap  finance.  The  difference  in  profit 
earning  opportunities  is  associated  with  difference  in  value  of  the  firms,  more  profit 
earning firms need access to capital markets to raise new capital and find it optimal to 
improve their governance practices.  
4.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
To  investigate  whether  differences  in  the  quality  of  firm  level  corporate 
governance also help to explain firm level financial needs in a cross-section of companies 
we regress external financing need on index of corporate governance (CGI) and control 
variables. The results indicate that there is positive association between need of equity 
financing and quality of corporate governance taken as aggregate corporate governance 
index and also with board composition and transparency and disclosure scores of these 
firms.  This  suggests  that  firms  which  need  more  equity  financing  practice  good 
governance and they are more transparent. The sub-index shareholdings and ownership is 
negatively associated with need of external financing indicating that the firms which have 
more concentrated shareholdings they depend less on external financing Thus with good 
corporate  governance  standards  in  place,  it  is  ultimately  the  financial  market  which 
rewards good governance practices and punishes bad governance. The interaction term of 
law with corporate governance have no significant impact. The investment opportunities 
are positively related to external finance and suggest that firms with high growth are in 
more need of external finance. Its interaction term with law has also positive influence on 
external financing requirements across firms. These results suggest legal environment 
matters  in  case  when  they  firms  rely  more  on  external  financing  sources.  The  firm 
specific factors matters more in influencing the need of external financing when the legal 
environment is less investor friendly.  
To investigate the relation between firm value and corporate governance, Tobin’s 
Q is regressed on corporate governance and firm attributes: investment opportunities, 
size,  and  concentration  of  ownership  and  need  of  external  finance.  Due  to 
multicolinearity in the variables: need of external financing and ownership concentration 
we  run  two  separate  regressions  using  these  two  variables  as  explanatory  variables. 
Positive and significant coefficient of CGI reveals the fact that firms with higher-quality  
9Block holder is defined by any investors having shareholdings of more than 10 percent. Javid and Iqbal   456
corporate governance are valued higher. When we regress Tobin’s Q on sub-indices of 
corporate governance, we find positive and significant results for Board and Disclosure 
but  positive  and  insignificant  for  Shareholder  Rights.  In  general  the  ownership  and 
shareholders rights that align the managers and shareholders interest are significantly 
valued by investors. This is also true for board composition and independence index.  
Both sub-indices board and disclosures have positive association with firm performance. 
These results are consistent with agency theory which focuses on monitoring of managers 
whose interests are assumed to diverge from those of other share holders.   
Table 1 
Evidence on Determinants of External Financing 
Dependent Variable is EXF 
Independent Variables  1  2  3  4 
CGI   0.38* 
(12.91)    
Disc   0.62* 
(3.87)   
Board    0.25* 
(7.63)  
Shareholders  Rights     –0.12 
(–7.11) 

































2  0.68  0.31  0.31  0.44 
The table reports the determinants of external finance estimated by Generalised Method of Moment: 
it i i i i i CGI Lw Size Inv CGI EF * 4 3 2 1 
EFi is external finance that is calculated by multiplying market capitalisation of each firm with percentage of 
shares that are not taken by the top three shareholders of each firm. 
CGIi  is  corporate  governance  index  measured  by  Javid  and  Robina  (2006),  Invi  is  investment 
opportunities measured by the past growth in sales, lwi is rule of law that is used for the proxy of enforcement of 
law, and Sizei is measured by the log of total asset.  
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Values 
in parenthesis are t-statistics.  
However the assumptions of agency theory are not applied to block holder owned 
firms. Most of the firms listed on KSE are family owned or institution owned. In these 
firms the alignment of ownership and control is tight and thus suggesting the need of 
outside directors on the board. Interaction term for need of external finance with law has 
the  expected  positive  sign  for  Pakistan  with  poor  legal  environment.  This  result  is 
consisted with notion that positive relationship between need of external finance and the 
firm valuation is stronger in weak legal regime. The study by Dernev and Kim (2003) 
also conclude that high class corporate governance is valued higher in case of US market. 
The  concentration  of  ownership  has  positive  impact  on  the  firm  performance.  The 
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suggesting that with less legal protection investor chose to invest out of internal sources 
and results in more concentration of ownership. This results validated La Porta (2002) 
hypothesis the concentration of ownership is response of weak legal environment. 
Investment  opportunities  have  positive  and  significant  impact  on  corporate 
valuation  measured  by  the  Tobin’s  Q  all  specifications.  Our  results  confirm  our 
predictions that firms with better investment opportunities have higher valuation. The 
coefficient of size is positive and significant in most of the cases. This shows that the 
listed firms that are likely to grow faster usually have more intangible assets and they 
adopt better corporate governance practices. The result of interaction term of rule of law 
with corporate governance does not have any significant impact on the valuation of the 
firm. These results indicate that legal framework is not providing relevant information 
regarding firm valuation in case of Pakistan.   
Table 2  
Evidence on Firm Performance and Corporate Governance 
Dependent Variable is Tobin Q 
Independent Variables         
CGI   0.005* 
(6.54)    
0.00* 
(5.43)    
Board   0.005* 
(4.71)    
0.01* 
(4.71)   
SR    0.01* 
(7.53)    
0.003* 
(6.47)  
DIS     0.01* 
(2.41)    
0.01** 
(3.66) 







(3.10)     









































































2  0.59  0.61  0.47  0.45  0.59  0.61  0.47  0.45 
The table reports the results of relationship between firm valuation and corporate governance estimated by 
Generalised Method of Moment: 
it i i i i i i i CGI Lw Size Inv Own Exf CGI Q * 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Qi is Tobins’Q measured by market value of common equity plus book value of long term debt divided by book 
value of total assets. 
CGIi is corporate governance index,  
Owni is ownership concentration with top five shareholders 
Invi is investment opportunities as measured by the past growth in sale,  
Lwi  is rule of law,  
Sizei  is measured by the log of total asset, and Lev is leverage measured by book value of long term debt 
divided by book value of total asset. 
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Values 
in parenthesis are t-statistics. Javid and Iqbal   458
However, these findings are consistent to some extent with the notion that positive 
relationship is between governance and valuation is stronger in weak legal regimes [La 
Porta, et al. (1997)]. This explains the reason of mixed relation between firm valuation 
and corporate governance in US firms which are subject to strongest legal framework 
worldwide. [La Porta, et al. (1998) and Dunev and Kim (2003)].  
Table 3 
Evidence on Determinants of Corporate Governance 
Dependent Variable is CGI  Dependent Variables is Disclosures 
Exf  0.12* 
(4.29)   
0.10* 
(2.15)   
































Lev    0.40* 
(19..70)   
0.02* 
(2.48) 
LAW*Exf  –0.10*** 
(–1.22)   
–0.04 
(–2.58)   




















R2  0.47  0.31  0.47  0.27  0.30  0.27 
The  table  reports  the  relationship  between  corporate  governance,  ownership  concentration  and  investment 
opportunities estimated by Generalised Method of Moment: 
it i i i i i i i i i i Exf Lw Own Lw Lev Inv Size Own Exf CGI * * 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
CGIi is a vector of governance index. 
Exfi is external finance that is calculated by multiplying market capitalisation of each firm with percentage of 
shares that are not taken by the top three shareholders of each firm. 
Lwi is defined as rule of law capturing the enforcement quality of legal regime.  
Invi is investment opportunities measured by the past growth in sale.  
Sizei  is measured by the log of total asset, and Lev is leverage measured by book value of long term debt 
divided by book value of total asset 
Owni  is  ownership  concentration  by  the  firms  and  calculated  as  percentage  shareholdings  by  top  three 
shareholders. Size is measured by the log of total asset. 
Levi is leverage defined as book value of long term debt divided by book value of total assets 
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Values 
in parenthesis are t-statistics  
We  regress  individual  firm  corporate  governance  score  on  need  of  external 
finance, ownership concentration, capital structure investment opportunities, size and 
interaction  term  of  rule  of  law  with  need  of  external  finance  and  ownership 
concentration.   The need of external finance by the firms have positive impact both 
CGI and Disclosure scores. This confirms the theoretical notion that firms which rely 
more on  external equity  sources for  their  expansion  they perform better  corporate 
governance practices and disclose more. The interaction terms of legal regime with External Financial Resource Management   459
external finance show negative and significant relationship with CGI and Disclosure 
scores  which  suggests  that  in  legal  environment  which  is  less  investor  friendly 
pushes the firms  to  adopt  better  corporate governance  practices  and  become  more 
transparent.  
Ownership structure shows negative and significant relationship with CGI and 
Disclosure scores. When an interaction term of ownership concentration with rule of 
law is included we also find negative and significant impact of legal environment. 
This  suggests  that  weakness  of  investment  protection  and  absence  of  corporate 
control firms rely on governance structure that is dominated by high concentration of 
ownership.  
The  firm  with  concentrated  ownership  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  firms  to 
disclose more. The inclusion of disclosure and transparency scores and other attributes 
are included in CGI scores also and they are not directly related to agency problem. In 
addition, this result indicates that positive relationship between corporate governance and 
ownership concentration is strong with weak legal regime. The Dunev and Kim (2003) 
have come up with same finding in case of US market.  
The coefficient of leverage is positive and significant, which is consistent with 
the prediction of standard  theory of capital structure  which says that high levered 
firm adopt better practices and the higher leverage increase firm’s value [Rajan and 
Zingales (1998)]. The positive sign of the coefficient of size shows that large firms 
show better governance. Investment opportunities have positive impact both CGI and 
Disclosure  scores.  This  confirms  the  theoretical  notion  that  firms  with  better 
investment  opportunities  perform  better  corporate  governance  practices  and  are 
transparent.  
5.  CONCLUSION 
Economic  researchers  have  studied  how  various  microeconomic  and 
macroeconomic   factors influence access to external finance widely for the developed 
markets  but  very  little  work  has  been  done  on  how  factors  effect  access  to  external 
finance  in  case  of  emerging  markets.  In  this  study  we  fill  this  gap  by  analysing  an 
important  issue  of  our  times  that  firms  that  practice  good  governance  and  better 
disclosures are one who raise external finance and are growing faster for the Karachi 
Stock Market. To address this issue empirically we estimated three models. First, we 
investigate that the firms with greater needs for external financing practice higher-quality 
governance  and  disclose  more.  Second,  firms  that  score  higher  in  governance  and 
transparency  rankings  are  valued  higher  in  the  stock  market.  Third,  the  quality  of 
corporate governance  is positively  related  to  growth  in  investment  opportunities,  and 
negatively concentration of ownership. Our sample firm consists of 50 firms which are 
active, representative of all non-financial sectors and comprises more than 80 percent of 
market  capitalisation  at  Karachi  stock  market.  The  period  covered  is  2002  to  2007 
because SECP has announced the Corporate Governance Ordinance 2002 and panel data 
estimation technique is used for analysis. 
In this study, we presented a simple model of determinants of external finance. 
Our result shows that the strength of corporate governance systems affects the external 
financing  needs  of  corporations.  This  suggests  that  firms  which  need  more  equity Javid and Iqbal   460
financing practice good governance. Thus with good corporate governance standards in 
place, it is ultimately the financial market which rewards good governance practices and 
punishes bad governance. The results show that firms with high growth and large in size 
are  in  more  need  of  external  finance.  Our  results  also  generally  confirm  the  crucial 
prediction  of  the  theory  that  positive  relationship  between  corporate  governance  and 
valuation is strong in weak legal regime countries like Pakistan. Thus legal protection is 
essential for effective corporate governance.  One implication that comes out from these 
findings that pro-growth polices generate more profitable investment opportunities and 
stimulate the external financing needs of the corporations Our results adds an important 
link to the explanation of the consequences weak legal environment for financial market 
development, external financing, corporate valuation and corporate governance.  External Financial Resource Management   461
Table A1 
List of Companies 
Companies  Symbols 
(1)  Aruj Garments  ARUJG 
(2)  Honda Atlas  HONDAA 
(3)  Engro Chemical  ENGRO 
(4)  Unilever Pakistan  UNIP 
(5)  Pakistan Gum and Chemicals Ltd  PAKGUM 
(6)  Abbot Pakistan  ABBOT 
(7)  Sakrand Sugar Mills  SAKSM 
(8)  Pakistan Hotel Development Ltd  PAKH 
(9)  Bata Pakistan  BATA 
(10)  Pakistan Petroleum Ltd  PPL 
(11)  Oil and Gas development Corp Ltd  OGDC 
(12)  Agriauto Industries Ltd  AGRI 
(13)  Pakistan PVC Ltd  PAKPVC 
(14)  Pakistan Papaersack Corporation  PAKPAPC 
(15)  Mandviwalla Mauser  MANDM 
(16)  Shahtaj Sugar Mills  SHAHT 
(17)  S.G. Fibre Ltd  SGFL 
(18)  Mirza Sugar Mills  MIRGAS 
(19)  Emco Industries Ltd  EMCOI 
(20)  Metropolitan Steel  METRO 
(21)  Moonlite (Pak)  MOONLITE 
(22)  Merit Packing Ltd  MERITP 
(23)  Pakistan Services  PAKS 
(24)  ICI Pakistan  ICIPAK 
(25)  Suzuki Motorcycles  SUZM 
(26)  Mohammad Farooq Textiles  MOHFT 
(27)  Paramount Spinning Mills  PSM 
(28)  Azam Textiles  AZAM 
(29)  Dar Es Salaam  DARES 
(30)  Sindh Abadgars  SINDHA 
(31)  Ellcot Spinning Mills  ELLCOTS 
(32)  Ayesha Textile  AYSHAT 
(33)  Brother Textiles Ltd  BROTHERT 
(34)  Mitchell’s Fruit  MITCH 
(35)  Indus Polyester Company  INDUSP 
(36)  Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills  MIRS 
(37)  Nestle Pakistan  NESTLE 
(38)  Din Motors  DINM 
(39)  Indus Motors  INDUSM 
(40)  Maple Leaf Cement  MAPLEL 
(41)  National Refinery  NATR 
(42)  Pakistan Tobacco  PAKTAB 
(43)  Dawood Hercules  DAWOODH 
(44)  Sui Northern  SUIN 
(45)  Fuji Fertiliser  FFC 
(46)  Fuji Bin Quasim  FBQ 
(47)  PTCL  PTCL 
(48)  Ferozsons Ltd  FERL 
(49)  Southern Electric  SOUTE 
(50)  Japan Powers  JAPP Javid and Iqbal   462
Table A2 
Description of Variables 
Variable  Symbol  Definition 
External Equity Finance  EXF  Market  capitalisation  of  each  firm  multiply  with  percentage  of 
shares  that  are  not  taken  by  the  top  five  shareholders.  Source: 
Market  capitalisation  from  Business  Recorder’s  website 
(www.brecorder.com.pk), percentage of shares are not held by top 
five shareholders is obtained from annual reports of corporation. 
Firm Value  Q  Tobin Q defined as sum of the book value of long term debt and 
market value of the equity divided by the book value of the total 
asset. Source: Annual Reports of Corporations. 
Investment Opportunities  Inv  Average Sales Growth. Source: Annual Reports of Corporations 
Corporate Governance  CGI  Score of Corporate Governance Index. Source: Javid and Robina 
(2006). 
Disclosure  Dis  Disclosure  and  Transparency  Scores.  Source:  Javid  and  Robina 
(2006). 
Ownership Concentration  Own   Percentage of share ownership of first five largest shareholders. 
Source: Annual Reports of Corporations. 
Size of the Firm  Size  Ln(Assets). Source: Annual Reports of Corporations. 
Law  Lw  Rule of law. Source World Bank. 
Leverage  Lev  Book value of Long term Debt/Book value of total asset. Source: 
Annual Reports of Corporations. 
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